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Yokohammer wrote:So same advice to you as to Kurogane: if you're going to post something that's supposed to support a stance you're taking, read it carefully first.
kurogane wrote:Yokohammer wrote:So same advice to you as to Kurogane: if you're going to post something that's supposed to support a stance you're taking, read it carefully first.
Right back at you. Thinking something means something because you think it should mean whatever it is you want it to mean isn't the same as something meaning what it means. Like the ICJ ruling that didn't ban whaling, even though we would all prefer it did. Which they can't do until they change the treaty. Japan isn't ignoring the ruling; they're quibbling over what it meant (which is why they look like idiotic 8 year olds). And, sadly for the minkey whales, they're righterer than people claiming the ruling banned the whale hunt. Which it didn't, because it can't.
wagyl wrote:I'm getting sick of keeping bastards honest. It might be time to leave you to your own cesspit.
wagyl wrote: I'm getting sick of keeping bastards honest. It might be time to leave you to your own cesspit.
Yokohammer wrote:wagyl wrote:I'm getting sick of keeping bastards honest. It might be time to leave you to your own cesspit.
And you would be perfectly justified in doing so.
Too many discussions beginning to resemble the Monty Python Argument Clinic.
It's a shame really, but it's just not worth the time and effort.
Russell wrote:Yokohammer wrote:wagyl wrote:I'm getting sick of keeping bastards honest. It might be time to leave you to your own cesspit.
And you would be perfectly justified in doing so.
Too many discussions beginning to resemble the Monty Python Argument Clinic.
It's a shame really, but it's just not worth the time and effort.
Finally you guys figured it out.
kurogane wrote:wagyl wrote: I'm getting sick of keeping bastards honest. It might be time to leave you to your own cesspit.
Please do. It's not intended as a harsh criticism but you can be presumptuous at times. Feel free not to be.
My only objection here are these hysterical accusations insisting that the Japanese are ignoring international law and an ICJ ruling when they're plainly not. They're parsing and quibbling over the ruling in question and the reach of the jurisdiction, but that is what law and legal rulings are all about in much of the world. The ruling itself was a similar measure: all concerned know whaling isn't banned totally, so they used a western biased venue to argue that the Japanese claims of a loophole weren't being satisfied, and the Japanese response is to quibble over the specifics of that loophole, not to ignore the ruling in toto, although they were shortsighted to agree to participation in the ICJ at all, being little more than a bully pulpit for the White is Right lobby. Other than that we all seem to agree that not hunting the whales at all would be better for everyone, the Japanese included, especially since nobody wants to eat it and it's a significant waste of public money, plus their current stance (and esp. the claimed exclusions) is eerily reminiscent of the League of Nations walkout. Even though they had legitimate objections back then and do here now, that didn't end well.
PS Truth be told, there is only one member on here I truly consider genuinely stupid. Just to be clear.
6 October 2015
I have the honour, by direction of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to declare on behalf of the Government of Japan that, in conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Japan recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation and on condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, over all disputes arising on and after 15 September 1958 with regard to situations or facts subsequent to the same date and being not settled by other means of peaceful settlement.
This declaration does not apply to:
(1) any dispute which the parties thereto have agreed or shall agree to refer for final and binding decision to arbitration or judicial settlement;
(2) any dispute in respect of which any other party to the dispute has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice only in relation to or for the purpose of the dispute; or where the acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction on behalf of any other party to the dispute was deposited or notified less than twelve months prior to the filing of the application bringing the dispute before the Court;
(3) any dispute arising out of, concerning, or relating to research on, or conservation, management or exploitation of, living resources of the sea.
The Government of Japan reserves the right at any time, by means of a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and with effect as from the moment of such notification, either to amend or terminate the present declaration.
(Signed)
Motohide Yoshikawa
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations
In 2014, a blossoming friendship between Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott and Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe looked to have all but sewn up a $40 billion submarine deal. Then French naval contractor DCNS hatched a bold and seemingly hopeless plan to crash the party.
Almost 18 months later, France this week secured a remarkable come-from-behind victory on one of the world’s most lucrative defense deals. The result: Tokyo’s dream of fast-tracking a revival of its arms export industry is left in disarray.
Interviews with more than a dozen Japanese, French, Australian and German government and industry officials show how a series of missteps by a disparate Japanese group of ministry officials, corporate executives and diplomats badly undermined their bid.
In particular, Japan misread the changing political landscape in Australia as Abbott fell from favor. The Japanese group, which included Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, also failed to clearly commit to providing skilled shipbuilding jobs in Australia. And Tokyo realized far too late its bid was being outflanked by the Germans and particularly the French, the sources involved in the bid said.
France, on the other hand, mobilized its vast and experienced military-industrial complex and hired a powerful Australian submarine industry insider, Sean Costello, who led it to an unexpected victory.
Japan’s loss represents a major setback for Abe’s push to develop an arms export industry as part of a more muscular security agenda after decades of pacifism.
“We put our utmost effort into the bid,” the head of the Defense Ministry’s procurement agency Hideaki Watanabe said after the result was announced on Tuesday. “We will do a thorough analysis of what impact the result will have on our defense industry.”
By the end of 2014, Japan was still comfortably in the driving seat thanks to the relationship between Abe and Abbott, which had begun soon after Abbott’s 2013 election and strengthened quickly.
Japan and Australia — key allies of the United States — had wanted to cement security ties to counter to China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and beyond.
Still, France saw an opportunity to get into the game. In November 2014, DCNS CEO Herve Guillou prevailed on French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian to visit Australia and start the pitch for France.
Le Drian traveled to Albany in the country’s remote southwest, where officials had gathered to commemorate the 100-year anniversary of the first sailing of Australian soldiers to fight on France’s Western Front during World War I.
The poignant shared history opened the door to discussions about the submarine contract, a source close to the French Ministry of Defense said.
“The French minister wished to be there for this important event. There, he held talks with his Australian counterpart David Johnston and with … Abbott,” said the source, who along with other officials asked not to be identified because he was not authorized to speak to the media.
Soon after, however, Australia’s political instability would erode Japan’s advantage with the old guard.
In December 2014, Johnston, the Australian defense minister, was forced to resign after disparaging the skills of Australian shipbuilders.
Lawmakers from South Australia, worried that Abbott had quietly agreed to Japan supplying the new submarines, insisted the government look at options to build them in their state. They pressured the prime minister into holding a competitive tender that DCNS and Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems quickly joined.
In February 2015, Abbott called his “best friend in Asia,” as he had previously described Abe, to tell him about the new bidding process. Abe sympathized and said he would do his best to comply, two sources with knowledge of the conversation said.
Yet, convinced the deal was still in the bag, Japan’s bidding group dithered.
“Even though we were in the competition we acted as though nothing had changed,” said one Japanese government source involved in the bid. “We thought we had already won, so why do anything to rock the boat?”
The Japanese did not attend a conference for the Future Submarines project in March, failing to understand the importance of the crucial lobbying event and leaving the field to their German and French rivals, sources on the Japanese bidding team said.
Japan’s belated attempt to engage with potential local suppliers at a follow up event in August 2015 went badly.
Companies complained Tokyo was unwilling to discuss substantive deals. Having only ever sold arms to Japan’s military because of a decades-old ban on exports that Abe lifted in 2014, neither MHI nor KHI had any Australian military industrial partners.
And unlike France and Germany, which quickly committed to building the submarines in Australia, Japan initially only said it would follow the bidding rules, which required building in Australia as just one of three options.
“The Japanese had been invited in on a handshake deal and were left trying to compete in an international competition having no experience in doing such a thing,” an Australian defense industry source said.
By September 2015, Japan’s key ally Abbott had been deposed by Malcolm Turnbull, blowing the competition wide open.
Industry officials said all of the sub offerings had some drawbacks, meaning other factors including experience and connections came into play.
Crucially, in April 2015 DCNS had hired Costello, who earlier that year lost his job as chief of staff of Australia’s Defense Ministry in the wake of Johnston’s resignation.
A former navy submariner who had also been the general manager for strategy at state-run Australian submarine firm ASC, Costello was ideally placed to lead a bid.
Had the Japanese called first, Costello would have likely accepted an offer to head their bid, according to a source who knows Costello. “They didn’t pick up the phone,” he said. Costello declined to speak publicly about the bid.
Costello’s team drew up a list of a dozen tasks DCNS needed to complete to win the deal, including the critical job of winning over U.S. defense companies Lockheed Martin Corp. and Raytheon Co., one of which will eventually build the submarine’s combat system.
In a final coordinated push, a huge delegation of French government and business leaders visited Australia a month ago, touting the economic benefits of their bid.
Finally stung to action, Japan ramped up its campaign in September 2015. Senior defense bureaucrat Masaki Ishikawa stepped in to unite what had until then been a disjointed approach spread around various ministries, the Japanese ambassador in Canberra, Sumio Kusaka, and MHI.
Japan began talking about investment and development opportunities beyond defense, including the possibility of opening a lithium-ion battery plant in Australia, while MHI opened an Australia unit.
In a last-ditch attempt to woo Australia, Japan sent one of its Soryu submarines to Sydney this month. But as it sailed home on Tuesday, Turnbull announced the deal had gone to DCNS.
[...]
For Tokyo, another big international defense competition that could help Japan develop the arms export industry that Abe envisaged is unlikely any time soon.
A more likely tack will be joint development projects with overseas partners to embed Japanese companies in military industrial supply chains. That might even include components for Australia’s French submarines, one source in Tokyo said.
Other Japanese officials still want Australia to explain why they lost so they can learn from the painful and bewildering experience.
“We thought up to the end that we could have won,” another source in Japan said.
More
The bidding process has highlighted Japan’s inexperience in the global arms market, after a failure to submit a detailed budget plan for the project or identify a project leader to take overall responsibility, according to people close to the situation. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has twice intervened to tell the bid team to sharpen up its efforts, according to political insiders in Tokyo.
Meanwhile, the bid has exposed the fact that its largest contractors, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, have evolved their defence businesses around a single customer — the Japanese Ministry of Defence. Australia has, over the past two months, been laying increasing pressure on Japan to tighten the commercial terms of the bid, lay out a detailed budget and make it clear which company is leading the project.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d27f1502-cbf2 ... 7dd44.html
Takechanpoo wrote:both mitsu and kawasaki were unmotivated with this deal. 4 cho yen in a few decade. its not a big deal.
only Abe and his inner circle were eager with it because they wanted to recover the lost of shinkansen deal with indonesia.
and unlike japan, both france and germany need not to worry about leaking their techs of sub to china because china never can be their enemy geopolitically.
well, barracuda-class body and pump-jet system are way too overspec for diesel engine.
actually no country has yet built that submarine! omg! im sorry for aussie navy guys.
Ol Dirty Gaijin wrote:No one gives a shit about the whales in this case. As if the Japanese don't understand about pork barrelling for local jobs and votes.
Ol Dirty Gaijin wrote:As if the Japanese don't understand about pork barrelling for local jobs and votes.
Takechanpoo wrote:. if immediate vote catching is the main reason why aussie government selected the french proposal, it simply means they are stupid.
Ol Dirty Gaijin wrote:Takechanpoo wrote:. if immediate vote catching is the main reason why aussie government selected the french proposal, it simply means they are stupid.
It's an election year and SA has the second highest unemployment in Australia. 50billion to save Poodle Pyne and his mates as the last jobs in car manufacture and mining and winding up. Oh, and the highest energy cost. Yes, they are that stupid. Shoehorning a diesel into an untested nuclear design sub. There were other plus and minus points though. The Japanese subs are short range etc.
The French Module d'Energie Sous-Marine Autonome (MESMA) system is being offered by the French shipyard DCN for the Scorpène-class submarines. It is essentially a modified version of their nuclear propulsion system with heat being generated by ethanol and oxygen. A conventional turbine power plant powered by steam generated from the combustion of ethanol and stored oxygen at a pressure of 60 atmospheres. This pressure-firing allows exhaust carbon dioxide to be expelled overboard at any depth without an exhaust compressor.
Ol Dirty Gaijin wrote:Not the engineering I'm concerned about. The Barracuda class is a nuclear design and has yet to becommissionedBUILD.
Add moredollarsEUROZES for redesign and ironing out bugs.
Coligny wrote:Ol Dirty Gaijin wrote:Not the engineering I'm concerned about. The Barracuda class is a nuclear design and has yet to becommissionedBUILD.
Add moredollarsEUROZES for redesign and ironing out bugs.
Commissioned would imply that the paint is dry on at least one ship...
In 2014, a blossoming friendship between Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott and his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe looked to have all but sewn up a $40 billion submarine deal. Then French naval contractor DCNS hatched a bold and seemingly hopeless plan to gatecrash the party.
Almost 18 months later, France this week secured a remarkable come-from-behind victory on one of the world's most lucrative defense deals. The result: Tokyo's dream of fast-tracking a revival of its arms export industry is left in disarray.
Interviews with more than a dozen Japanese, French, Australian and German government and industry officials show how a series of missteps by a disparate Japanese group of ministry officials, corporate executives and diplomats badly undermined their bid.
In particular, Japan misread the changing political landscape in Australia as Abbott fell from favor. The Japanese group, which included Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) (7011.T) and Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI), (7012.T) also failed to clearly commit to providing skilled shipbuilding jobs in Australia. And Tokyo realized far too late its bid was being outflanked by the Germans and particularly the French, the sources involved in the bid said.
France, on the other hand, mobilized its vast and experienced military-industrial complex and hired a powerful Australian submarine industry insider, Sean Costello, who led it to an unexpected victory.
Japan's loss represents a major setback for Abe's push to develop an arms export industry as part of a more muscular security agenda after decades of pacifism.
"We put our utmost effort into the bid," the head of the Ministry of Defense's procurement agency Hideaki Watanabe said after the result was announced on Tuesday. "We will do a thorough analysis of what impact the result will have on our defense industry."
By the end of 2014, Japan was still comfortably in the driving seat thanks to the relationship between Abe and Abbott, which had begun soon after Abbott's 2013 election and strengthened quickly.
Japan and Australia - key allies of the United States - had wanted to cement security ties to counter to China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and beyond.
FRENCH OVERTURES
Still, France saw an opportunity to get into the game. In November 2014, DCNS CEO Herve Guillou prevailed on French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian to visit Australia and start the pitch for France.
Le Drian traveled to Albany in the country's remote southwest, where officials had gathered to commemorate the 100 year anniversary of the first sailing of Australian soldiers to fight on France's Western Front during World War One.
The poignant shared history opened the door to discussions about the submarine contract, a source close to the French Ministry of Defense told Reuters.
"The French minister wished to be there for this important event. There, he held talks with his Australian counterpart David Johnston and with ... Abbott," said the source, who along with other officials asked not to be identified because he was not authorized to speak to the media.
FIGHTING FOR JOBS
Soon after, however, Australia's political instability would erode Japan's advantage with the old guard.
In December 2014, Johnston, the Australian defense minister, was forced to resign after disparaging the skills of Australian shipbuilders.
South Australian lawmakers, worried that Abbott had quietly agreed to Japan supplying the new submarines, insisted the government look at options to build them in their state. They pressured the prime minister into holding a competitive tender which DCNS and Germany's ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKAG.DE) quickly joined.
In February 2015, Abbott called his "best friend in Asia", as he had previously described Abe, to tell him about the new bidding process. Abe sympathized and said he would do his best to comply, two sources with knowledge of the conversation said.
Yet, convinced the deal was still in the bag, Japan's bidding group dithered.
"Even though we were in the competition we acted as though nothing had changed," said one Japanese government source involved in the bid. "We thought we had already won, so why do anything to rock the boat?"
The Japanese did not attend a conference for the Future Submarines project in March, failing to understand the importance of the crucial lobbying event and leaving the field to their German and French rivals, sources within the Japanese bid said.
Japan's belated attempt to engage with potential local suppliers at a follow up event in August 2015 went badly.
Companies complained Tokyo was unwilling to discuss substantive deals. Having only ever sold arms to Japan's military because of a decades-old ban on exports that Abe lifted in 2014, neither Japanese company had any Australian military industrial partners.
And unlike France and Germany which quickly committed to building the submarines in Australia, Japan initially only said it would follow the bidding rules, which required building in Australia as just one of three options.
"The Japanese had been invited in on a handshake deal and were left trying to compete in an international competition having no experience in doing such a thing," an Australian defense industry source said.
By September 2015, Japan's key ally Abbott had been deposed by Malcolm Turnbull, blowing the competition wide open.
LOCAL EXPERTS
Industry officials said all of the sub offerings had some drawbacks, meaning other factors including experience and connections came into play.
Crucially, in April 2015, DCNS hired Costello, who had earlier that year lost his job as chief of staff of Australia's Defence Ministry in the wake of Johnston's resignation.
A former navy submariner who had also been the general manager for strategy at state-run Australian submarine firm ASC, Costello was ideally placed to lead a bid.
Had the Japanese called first, Costello would have likely have accepted an offer to head their bid, according to a source who knows Costello. "They didn’t pick up the phone," he said. Costello declined to speak publicly about the bid.
Costello's team drew up a list of a dozen tasks DCNS needed to complete to win the deal, including the critical job of winning over U.S. defense companies Lockheed Martin Corp (LMT.N) and Raytheon Co (RTN.N), one of which will eventually build the submarine's combat system.
In a final coordinated push, a huge delegation of French government and business leaders visited Australia a month ago, touting the economic benefits of their bid.
LATE JAPANESE PUSH
Finally stung to action, Japan ramped up its campaign in September 2015. Senior defense bureaucrat Masaki Ishikawa stepped in to unite what had until then been a disjointed approach spread around various ministries, the Japanese ambassador in Canberra, Sumio Kusaka, and MHI.
Japan began talking about investment and development opportunities beyond defense, including the possibility of opening a lithium-ion battery plant in Australia, while MHI opened an Australia unit.
In a last ditch attempt to woo Australia, Japan sent one of its Soryu submarines to Sydney this month. But as it sailed home on Tuesday, Turnbull announced the deal had gone to DCNS.
In an echo of his first Albany trip, Le Drian heard of France's win on Monday as he attended an ANZAC Day service for Australia's war dead in northwestern France.
For Tokyo, another big international defense competition that could help Japan develop the arms export industry that Abe envisaged is unlikely any time soon.
A more likely tack will be joint development projects with overseas partners to embed Japanese companies in military industrial supply chains. That might even include components for Australia's French submarines, one source in Tokyo said.
Other Japanese officials still want Australia to explain why they lost so they can learn from the painful and bewildering experience.
Canberra chose a French design for its next-generation submarine fleet partly because it can easily be refitted for nuclear propulsion by the time the vessels enter service, an influential Australian business daily has reported.
Japan proposed a diesel-powered design based on its Soryu-class sub, which Tokyo believes is one of the quietest in the world.
But Australia wanted the option of converting some of its 12 planned attack submarines from diesel to nuclear, the Australian Financial Review reported on its website Sunday, quoting unnamed political, government and industry sources.
Australia now plans to deploy 12 new submarines starting from the early 2030s to around 2050.
In general, a nuclear-powered submarine is noisier than a conventional one but can cruise underwater much longer without refueling or surfacing.
A nuclear submarine would allow Australia to reach China, the northern Pacific or the western edge of the Indian Ocean, the Australian newspaper reported.
“Cabinet ministers and defense officials have already discussed the possibility of switching from diesel engines to nuclear power part-way through the construction contract,” the website quoted unnamed sources as saying.
On April 26, Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced that his government had selected a diesel-powered submarine proposed by France’s state-controlled naval contractor DCNS.
The model, a Shortfin Barracuda, is to be based on the firm’s nuclear-powered Barracuda-class sub. Experts have pointed out that redesigning an atomic-powered submarine to accommodate diesel engines is extremely unusual.
Germany’s Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems and Japan’s Kawasaki Heavy Industries and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries competed with DCNS to win the 56 billion Australian dollar ($43 billion) contract. But neither produce nuclear-powered submarines.
More
Russell wrote:I just wonder why they did not order nuclear subs in the first place.
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