Accident in Amagasaki

[Mulboyne]

MDN: Driver of derailed Amagasaki train didn't apply brakes for 1 km
Ryujiro Takami, the driver of a train that derailed here in April and slammed into an apartment block, killing over 100 people, failed to apply the train's brakes from as far back as 1 kilometer from the accident scene, investigators have found...Officials said there was a possibility he was not fully conscious while he was driving the train.

[Big Booger]

MDN: Driver of derailed Amagasaki train didn't apply brakes for 1 km
Ryujiro Takami, the driver of a train that derailed here in April and slammed into an apartment block, killing over 100 people, failed to apply the train's brakes from as far back as 1 kilometer from the accident scene, investigators have found...Officials said there was a possibility he was not fully conscious while he was driving the train.

makes one wonder why there is not an automated backup system to takeover when blantant errors are made???

Remote controlled trains from a central command might also have been effective...

Do trains not have co-drivers???

[GuyJean]

Do trains not have co-drivers???

Especially for 23 year olds who've fucked up in the past... Boggles the mind; the dinosaur's brain..

GJ

[Mulboyne]

Yomiuri: Drivers report minimal improvement in JR safety
More than 60 percent of West Japan Railway Co. drivers responding to a survey said the firm's attitude toward safety remained unchanged even after the April 25, 2005, Fukuchiyama Line derailment in Amagasaki, Hyogo Prefecture. According to a Yomiuri Shimbun survey, more than 60 percent of the respondents also said they had made greater efforts to improve safety since the accident. The results showed that while individual drivers felt they had developed greater safety awareness, they did not feel the company's safety measures had improved overall.

The Yomiuri Shimbun surveyed about 350 drivers belonging to the firm's four major labor unions. However, the biggest labor union did not respond to the survey, saying it was unable to achieve an organizational consensus. The Yomiuri Shimbun obtained answers from 179 drivers from the three other labor unions in mid-March. Among the respondents, 64 percent said the firm had not made visible gains in its efforts to improve safety since the derailment. Thirty-nine drivers said the firm's safety had improved slightly, while only one respondent felt that the firm's efforts had greatly improved. Concerning driver safety, 65 percent said they had improved, producing a wide gap between driver self-evaluations and their assessments of the firm. The Yomiuri Shimbun asked the drivers to rate the firm's six key policies in its safety improvement plan. Reexamining the sharing and transmission of information, the drivers gave an average score of 43 out of 100.

[FG Lurker]

Driver of train that derailed in '05, killing 107 people, was listening to radio
Mainichi Daily News, December 20, 2006

The driver of a train that derailed on the JR Fukuchiyama Line in Amagasaki, Hyogo Prefecture, in April 2005, killing 107 people including himself, was preoccupied with listening to radio communications and was late in applying the brakes, a government report suggests.

Moreover, the report criticized West Japan Railway Co. that operates the line for not placing enough importance on safety, noting that it placed an excessive burden on drivers with its tight train schedule. It is rare that the committee mentions the responsibility of a railway company as an entity for an accident.

The Aircraft and Railway Accident Investigation Committee will compile a final report on the cause of the accident after interviewing those involved and experts during a hearing on Feb. 1.

(Full Story)

It's good to see that JR isn't going to be allowed to continue using the driver as a scapegoat. I hope the report is well publicized and that some JR heads roll for the decisions that eventually lead to this accident.

[Mulboyne]

Yomiuri: Report slams JR West's corporate culture

The final report released by a third-party panel of West Japan Railway Co. on the leakage of the transport authorities' final report on a fatal derailment criticized the company's corporate culture and revealed how the firm tried to conceal the truth. The report said JR West officials contacted the Aircraft and Railway Accidents Investigation Commission (now the Transport Safety Board) of the Construction and Transport Ministry, with the intention of obtaining information in advance about the contents of the report on the JR Fukuchiyama Line accident. The third-party panel concluded: "The company prioritized internal interests and took excessive action to protect itself. This tendency led to the present consequences."

JR West apparently approached the commission through various channels. Former President Masao Yamazaki, 66, approached Koichi Yamaguchi, 72, a former member of the investigation commission who had been a senior colleague at what was then Japanese National Railways. Yamazaki obtained a copy of a draft of the commission's final report from him and asked him to delete from the final report the phrase, "The accident could have been prevented if the train had been equipped with an automatic train-stop system." Tsuchiya Ryuichiro, 59, a former executive vice president of JR West who then served as chief of the company's office for accident prevention, repeatedly instructed his subordinates to wine and dine Yasuo Sato, 70, who at the time chaired a subpanel of the investigation commission in charge of train accidents. The employees attempted to glean information from Sato using a list of questions that had been prepared in advance.

Furthermore, JR West asked retired JNR officials to act as witnesses in a public hearing on the accident held in February 2007. The third-party panel's final report said such actions were taken because "there was a corporate culture that prioritized protection of the company's interests over those of the accident victims as well as public sentiment." The report also pointed out that Masataka Ide, 74, who became president of JR West in 1992 and reputedly was one of the top three JNR officials who realized the privatization of the state-run railway firm, had increasingly brushed aside other people's opinions. The report said: "His influence did not wane even after he became chairman and board adviser. In effect, he virtually controlled the company from behind the scenes. This gave rise to an organizational atmosphere that was closed to the outside and a corporate culture in which employees were reluctant to tell superiors anything, as well as a management style in which executives did not take the time to learn about working-level realities." The report clearly stated, "Under such management, technological affairs were treated lightly."

At a press conference Wednesday, JR West President Takayuki Sasaki said, "I think the [report's] conclusions are correct." However, the third-party panel's final report made no mention of criminal liability with regard to JR West's managers and the derailment. At the time of the accident, the Hyogo prefectural police conducted its investigation on suspicion of professional negligence resulting in death and injury, and asked the investigation commission to determine the cause of the accident. The commission's report can be used as evidence in a criminal trial. A senior prosecutor said, "The actions [taken by JR West] were aimed at preventing executives from being questioned over their criminal liability." The third-party panel's final report also stressed that JR West officials utilized personal connections that were formed during the JNR years. University graduates hired by the defunct JNR were seen as part of an elite group and were equivalent to fast-track bureaucrats among national public servants. The graduates were divided into groups--for example, engineering and electrical systems groups--each of which accepted only about 20 newcomers each year. In each of the groups, bosses and subordinates were said to have forged strong ties.

Yamazaki, Yamaguchi, JR West employees who worked between the two men, and former JNR workers who were asked by Yamazaki to be witnesses at the public hearings all belonged to a group comprising seniors and juniors that was in charge of train operations. As to why he gave a copy of the commission's draft report to Yamazaki, Yamaguchi said, "As we were colleagues for many years, I wanted to help him." The familylike ties among former JNR officials were especially strong in the groups, Sato said. Daily contact among officials in the same groups led to collusive relations between investigators and those being investigated, which finally resulted in the information leakage. Sato said: "I didn't think such high-level organizational actions had been taken. I feel I might have been used by them to a large extent. I regret it."

The information leakage also shook the trustworthiness of the investigation commission's reports. The Transport Safety Board will establish a reexamination team, including experts and family members of victims to probe the trustworthiness of the commission's report. The team will hold its first meeting in mid-December. The team is highly likely to tackle the appropriateness of the structure of the Transport Safety Board. Potential problems that likely will be addressed include the commission's subpanel in charge of train accidents having too many members who were former JNR executives and the fact no legal penalty can be levied against members for leaking information from the Transport Safety Board, even though they are equivalent to special national public servants. The reexamination may also urge that the Transport Safety Board--currently part of an extra-ministerial bureau of the transport ministry--should become an independent entity. An official of the board said, "Based on the reexamination team's discussions, we'll tackle [organizational reforms to prevent a recurrence of similar accidents]."

===

'Independence required'

Kunio Yanagida, a nonfiction writer who will serve as a member of the reexamination team, said: "For the company that caused harm to attempt to secretly obtain information and distort investigation results is an insult to those affected by the accident. "The reexamination team's task is not to clean up the mess of this scandal. Rather, it needs to discuss the background of the accident, how accident investigations should be conducted, and the ethical responsibility of accident-causing companies. An accident investigation entity differs from criminal investigation organizations. Its mission is to discern the root causes of an accident, taking into account various background factors and hammer out measures to prevent a recurrence. It's crucial for such an entity to have three key elements: neutrality, a wholly transparent investigation process and the ability to reach conclusions that satisfy bereaved families and people injured in the accident. Also, I have to say that the Transport Safety Board is not a mature body, because it is not fully independent of the investigations. Ideally, accident investigation entities should have their own authority to probe companies or administrative organizations and hold hearings. Such aspects need to be improved along with a strengthening of their authority."