Kyuma Resigns over A-Bomb Remarks

[Mulboyne]

[floatl][/floatl]Well, Defence Minister Kyuma has resigned over his atomic bomb comments. Here's an Asahi editorial on the issue (written before his resignation):

Kyuma's A-bomb remark
...In a shocking display of insensitivity, Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma said Saturday that the use of the atomic bombs "could not be helped." We were utterly appalled at his remarks. "I have come to accept in my mind that in order to end the war, it could not be helped that an atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki," Kyuma said, referring to the U.S. nuclear attack in the closing days of World War II. "From the viewpoint of international affairs and the situation of the postwar occupation, (the dropping of atomic bombs) was a possible option," he also said...Accepting the past use of nuclear weapons as something inevitable means tolerating the use of nuclear arms in the future if necessary. Such thinking makes a total mockery of Japan's postwar campaign to push the world toward the elimination of all nuclear weapons...

... The sad fact is that Japan's views of the atomic bombings are not widely shared by other countries. Sadako Kurihara, a Hiroshima-born poet, wrote a poem titled "When We Say Hiroshima."

When we say Hiroshima/ do we hear a gentle response of 'Ah, Hiroshima?'
When we say Hiroshima, we hear 'Pearl Harbor.'
When we say Hiroshima/ we hear 'the Nanking Massacre.'
When we say Hiroshima/ we hear echoes of blood and flames.

Japan's diplomatic attempt to make the atrocities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki known to the rest of the world has often been criticized by the United States and other Asian nations. These countries say Japan had it coming because Japan started the war. They also argue that the atomic bombs finally brought an end to the brutal war. There is no easy solution to this dispute. But Japan's position should be that the indiscriminate killings of innocent and defenseless Japanese civilians are still unpardonable, even though Japan started the war and caused huge damage to many other countries...more...

[Greji]

[floatl][/floatl]Well, Defence Minister Kyuma has resigned over his atomic bomb comments.

Japan's diplomatic attempt to make the atrocities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki known to the rest of the world has often been criticized by the United States and other Asian nations. These countries say Japan had it coming because Japan started the war. They also argue that the atomic bombs finally brought an end to the brutal war.

Hard to get away from the Japan the Victim view, isn't it? I had Japanese who I know and also who I work with say that most Japanese think "shoganai", but it should not be said publically!

Interesting.

Well no one ever said war was nice and if you're going to dance, you gotta pay the fiddler!

[CrankyBastard]

Yuriko Koike named defense minister after Kyuma resigns over A-bomb remarks.

This one is easier on the eyes.

[eighty5er]

In the A-Bomb museum in Hiroshima, they clearly state that any alternative to using the A-Bombs would lead to either a very bloody and long land conflict between Japan and the USA, resulting in more losses on both sides than the A-Boms produced, or Russian occupation. So unless Japan thinks those options are somehow better, they already openly admit that it was the best choice in Japan's interest. The real downside to it is that the rest of the world now is at risk of the use of these weapons. But even so, the use of them helped prevent future use so far.

[YourAverageSalaryman]

Bah, don't you just know there will be some dirt on Koike too? No Japanese politicians are EVER clean. Remember Toshikatu's replacal? Can't remember his name, but he was guilty as hell of receiving bribes from J-Green... on the other hand, she has been a member of a Koizumi Cabinet before according to this article, so who knows, maybe all the shit has been dug up already.

[Kuang_Grade]

Tojo's cabinet was more scared of the Russians joining the war than atom bombs...Far larger swaths of destruction and death had been incurred with conventional bombings prior to the A bomb attacks and the country still went on. The Russians were feared both since they would be as ruthless fighters and that the J populace was already nearing the breaking point and would have been susceptible to communist ideology....ie, revolutionary uprisings by J citizens against the Emperor.

As it is, it was the Emperor who was thankful for the atomic bomb....it gave him enough of an excuse to end the war with some semblance of face (how can we fight such things?) early enough to prevent Russians from taking over big chunks of Japan...and since the US wouldn't actually have any more A bombs ready for use for at least a few weeks/months, the US, also interested in not letting Russia occupy large chunks of Japan as well as ending the war as soon as possible, caved a little bit from its unconditional surrender policy to a policy of 'you surrender unconditionally and we won't get rid of the Emperor'. Without the A bombs, the odds of the Chrysanthemum throne surviving the war would have been effectively zero...either it would have been overthrown by a citizen revolt or the US and Russians, after suffering great causalities invading the country and probably killing off large portion of the J population in the process, would have abolished it.

[YourAverageSalaryman]

On Koike, one thing that never ceases to amaze me is how Japanese politicians flip flop from one party to the other, and how nobody seems to really care.

[Greji]

Tojo's cabinet was more scared of the Russians joining the war than atom bombs...Far larger swaths of destruction and death had been incurred with conventional bombings prior to the A bomb attacks and the country still went on. The Russians were feared both since they would be as ruthless fighters and that the J populace was already nearing the breaking point and would have been susceptible to communist ideology....ie, revolutionary uprisings by J citizens against the Emperor.

You're right on about the conventional bombing casualties being far greater than the A Bomb casualties. But, I have never seen anything that would indicate an uprising against the Imperial system. The government yes, but not the Emperor. Tojo himself, was long gone, having taken the sekinin and resigned at the loss of Saipan in 1944.

If I recall correctly from Command and Staff College teachings, Operation Downfall for the invasion in two prongs, had estimates of 250,000 US casualties for the initial implimentation of Operation Olympia (the invasion of Kyushu) with casualties expected to reach one million by the latter part of 1946. The second prong was Operation Coronet being the invasion of Honshu with 28 divisions, which would have produced even higher casualties, because of faulty intelligence on remaining home long strength of the Imperial Forces (i.e. The Japanese only had 2,500 aircraft at home for support, when in fact, they had over 28,000).

After Japan refused the Potsdam accords, the US learned from monitoring Japanese radio broadcasts, that Japan was closing all schools, mobilizing the schoolchildren, arming the civilian population, fortifying caves and constructing underground defenses in the home land.

My mother-in-law told me of having daily drills were all the girls and women were given bamboo stakes fashioned into spears and given martial arts type training on the use of these spears for when the barbarians appeared. She maintains they were told and all prepared to fight to the death for the homeland and Emperor. They were told that if the barbarians were to come, since death was probably forthcoming in that event, they should attempt to make a significant "rippa no saigo".

The J-government's thinking changed quickly when the ABombs went off; however, as most of us have heard, even when the "that's it, I quit" decision was made, they had to hide the Emperor's recording of the surrender speech from capture by elements of the Imperial Military who sought to prevent it from being played because they felt they should fight to the end and that one big battle to turn the tide of the war in favor of Japan was soon coming (like Togo Heihachiro's victory of the Russian Fleet at the battle of Tsushima Straights).

Japan had long used many slogans, from the old League of Nations limits on tonnage of her ships, to the oil import restrictions as the basis for their expansion efforts as a country which was being "Victimized" by the West. This was changed to campaigns to free Asia of Western (read white) Colonialism with the early war successes. This Victim verbage continues to this day as evidenced by the attacks on Kyuma for what was probably, as Spock would say, a "Very logical statement, Captain". Almost all of the national level politicians shy away from defined sides on this issue, but the local level politicians and the head of the survivors' groups consistantly identify Japan as a war victim based on their being the only country to have some serious rentogens applied to its surface.

[Mulboyne]

Yomiuri editorial:

Kyuma's comment tactless, but factual

Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma resigned on Tuesday to take responsibility for controversy stirred by his remarks regarding the U.S. atomic bombings of Japan during World War II. At a lecture in Kashiwa, Chiba Prefecture, on Saturday, Kyuma said, "I understand the bombing brought the war to an end. I think it was something that couldn't be helped." The phrase "couldn't be helped" is such an inconsiderate expression. With the House of Councillors election approaching, the opposition parties--which seized on the remark as a suitable basis on which to criticize the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe--have sought Kyuma's dismissal from the Cabinet. The ruling coalition was reeling at the prospect of Kyuma's remarks having an adverse effect on the upcoming election. The result was Kyuma's resignation. This was not Kyuma's first gaffe. He said that the Japanese government had not officially announced its support for the war in Iraq. Kyuma's departure was unavoidable as he continued to repeat such errors. In Saturday's lecture, Kyuma offered his opinion that the United States dropped the atomic bombs under an assumption that the bombing would make Japan surrender as well as prevent the Soviet Union from joining the war in the Pacific.

This was not incorrect. The United States, with its developing mistrust of the Soviet Union at the time, wanted to finish the war at the earliest possible time before the Soviet Union entered the conflict. At the same time, Kyuma added, "I still wonder whether the United States needed to use the atomic bomb since it knew it would triumph in battle." Even within the U.S. administration, some voiced opposition toward the atomic bombing of Japan, including Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was then supreme Allied commander in Europe and later the U.S. president. Kyuma questioned the United States' use of such an inhumane weapon as the atomic bomb. In the first place, one of the major factors in bringing the tragedy of the atomic bombings to Japan was the failure of Japanese political leaders' diplomatic maneuvers to end the war. Taking the foolish measure of asking the Soviet Union, a potential enemy, to broker a peace deal, Japan wasted its time negotiating with the country, leading to the atomic bombings and the Soviet Union's entry into the war.

The opposition parties, meanwhile, criticized Kyuma's remarks with mere emotional rhetoric, saying "[Kyuma's remarks] echoed the U.S. opinions," or "He can't get away with just saying 'it couldn't be helped.'" They did not try to hold discussion based on the facts and unclouded by emotion. What was questionable was Democratic Party of Japan President Ichiro Ozawa pressing Abe to demand the United States apologize for the atomic bombing during the debate between the two party leaders Sunday. The prime minister rejected the demand, saying U.S. nuclear deterrence is now required to prevent North Korea from using nuclear weapons as Pyongyang tries to equip itself with nuclear arms and threatens Japan's security. Abe's response was wholly reasonable. Ozawa's dishonorable statement, which ignored Japan's security situation, only served to make us question his party's ability to hold the reins of government. Yuriko Koike, a national security advisor to the prime minister, was appointed as Kyuma's successor. Bracing itself up again, the Abe administration should fulfill its responsibilities, including defending the nation.

[Kuang_Grade]

GB, you are right about Tojo...I Was thinking about Togo, the foreign minster at the end.

And I don't want to imply there were cadres of Marxists running around the countryside trying to incite revolt but rather the cabinet was becoming worried that order was starting to breakdown in J society, and given a bombed, burned out and hungry populace, it doesn't take much for people to go from "the gov sucks" to "the whole system sucks".

But while Hirohito played up the A Bombs in the surrender announcement to the J public, he actually didn't mention them in his 'explanation' to the Japanese military, where he only talked about threat the Soviets posed.

http://www.taiwandocuments.org/surrender07.htm

Three years and eight months have elapsed since we declared war on the United States and Britain. During this time our beloved men of the army and navy, sacrificing their lives, have fought valiantly on disease-stricken and barren lands and on tempestuous waters in the blazing sun, and of this we are deeply grateful.

Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue the war under the present internal and external conditions would be only to increase needlessly the ravages of war finally to the point of endangering the very foundation of the Empire's existence

With that in mind and although the fighting spirit of the Imperial Army and Navy is as high as ever, with a view to maintaining and protecting our noble national policy we are about to make peace with the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and Chungking.

This transcript a fairly recent PBS documentary on the end of the war also covers the role the Atomic bomb and the Russians had on Japanese decision making. I believe this show borrowed heavily from Richard Frank's book Downfall:The End of the Japanese Imperial Empire
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pacific/filmmore/pt.html

[soulboy]

http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0803-26.htm

[hundefar]

http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0803-26.htm

I recommend that every one who is interested in the american decision to use the atomic bomb read Hasegawa's book that is mentioned in the above link. As far as I know he is the only historian that has ever been able to read primary sources in both Russian, English, and Japanese. In my opinion it is hard to stick to the "the use of the bomb ended the war and saved a lot of lives" story after reading it.

[Tsuru]

I think we got another one brewing here:

Akagi denies funding irregularities

My my... 12300 man buys a lot of Romanian wine

[Greji]

I recommend that every one who is interested in the american decision to use the atomic bomb read Hasegawa's book that is mentioned in the above link. As far as I know he is the only historian that has ever been able to read primary sources in both Russian, English, and Japanese. In my opinion it is hard to stick to the "the use of the bomb ended the war and saved a lot of lives" story after reading it.

After talking with elder Japanese who are not selling books (not only my mother-in-law, but other non=agenda possessing Japanese) and learning of the training they received to fight until the death to defend the home land, I wonder if Hasegawa really met with other Japanese of that age group in his research. How does he address the fact that the military was trying to steal the Emperor's surrender recording to keep the war going?

The Russians will the enemy of choice of the Army which led to a lot of the conflicts that hampered Japan's General Staff all through the war. But aa far as invaders of the mother land, they were no more loathed, or feared than the US, UK or whoever. All FGs were barbarians regardless. If anything, Japan probably had a false belief that they could do better against the Russians, because the lower number of Russian troops in the Asian theater and Japan's own successes in the previous war against Russia. The US remained the main enemy of concentration all through the war.

Hasegawa writes from the standard "Japan the victim" view point. You will not convince a lot of people otherwise. You might want to take a look at the SCAP reports and summaries of men at arms, munitions and weapon systems Japan at home had remaining at the end of the war before you fall in to the poor, defeated victims' syndrome and think they were ready to give up their homeland without being exposed to a demonstration of abject power to convince them it was fruitless. It was interesting the even with the ABombs, there were those who did not want to quit.

[hundefar]

After talking with elder Japanese who are not selling books (not only my mother-in-law, but other non=agenda possessing Japanese) and learning of the training they received to fight until the death to defend the home land, I wonder if Hasegawa really met with other Japanese of that age group in his research. How does he address the fact that the military was trying to steal the Emperor's surrender recording to keep the war going?

The Russians will the enemy of choice of the Army which led to a lot of the conflicts that hampered Japan's General Staff all through the war. But aa far as invaders of the mother land, they were no more loathed, or feared than the US, UK or whoever. All FGs were barbarians regardless. If anything, Japan probably had a false belief that they could do better against the Russians, because the lower number of Russian troops in the Asian theater and Japan's own successes in the previous war against Russia. The US remained the main enemy of concentration all through the war.

Hasegawa writes from the standard "Japan the victim" view point. You will not convince a lot of people otherwise. You might want to take a look at the SCAP reports and summaries of men at arms, munitions and weapon systems Japan at home had remaining at the end of the war before you fall in to the poor, defeated victims' syndrome and think they were ready to give up their homeland without being exposed to a demonstration of abject power to convince them it was fruitless. It was interesting the even with the ABombs, there were those who did not want to quit.

Hasegawa does not go into the training of civilians, as his book is concerned with the trilateral relationship between Russia, Japan and USA, and the reason why USA chose to use the atombomb. You are wrong if you think that he writes from the usual Japan is victim POV, as his view is a bit more complex than that. He differs from people such as Gar Alperovitz (who wrote the article linked to above in this thread) in that way.

He is IMO a really good historian and he has advanced historical research a lot. I recommend that you actually read his book, and also the roundtable discussion to be found on H-Net where every single leading historian in this field delivers a criticque of his work. If you are interested in this subject it is really worth reading. Though Hasegawas work is by no means perfect, there is no denying that he has brought something new to the table. This has been done mainly by him having access to the Russian files, and his ability to compare the original Russian sources with the Japanese and English languaged sources.

He is not trying to paint a pretty picture at all. It seems more to me like he is interested in uncovering the reasons for events unfolding as they did. It is a complicated book with many sources, so unfortunately I can't really do it justice here as it would take too long, so I can only recommend it, if one is interested in the latest development in the research into the subject.

But here is a quick summary:

Hasegawa demonstrates that what led to capitulation was the wording of the messages conveyed to the japanese, not the bombs. They did not change anything from the POV of the japanese military, who were willing to go on no matter what (as you say). Hence the claim that the "bombs ended the war and saved lives" is false. He also shows that experts on Japan who were counsellors to the US government all the way through said that the japanese would not capitulate if the wording was not changed. He also shows that a leading faction close to the emperor were trying to negotiate capitulation through the Russians, and that this bore no fruit because of the competition between Russia and USA.

[Greji]

He is IMO a really good historian and he has advanced historical research a lot. I recommend that you actually read his book, and also the roundtable discussion to be found on H-Net where every single leading historian in this field delivers a criticque of his work.

I have read capsulized versions of the book and agree that he is a well researched writer and does quite well as a non-native speaker in an English presentation.

His main protagonist is Sadao Asada from Doshisha University who like several others (and myself from what I have read of it) find it lacking in some areas.

First, he cites government and military archives at the end of the war which were destroyed least they fall into Allied hands, which cannot be verified. Secondly, he refers to a seemingly "100 meter dash" between Truman and Joe Stalin to invade Japan. The timing between the bombings and the surrender is too short to accurately gauge this comparison.

As you say the J-military were in for the duration and the likes of General Kawabe then Chief of Staff, who felt Japan must endure to the end. Those views were paramount among the opinions of many of the higher archy of the Imperial staff.

The findings that the bombs were in fact nuclear were made by Japan's sole nuclear scientist (sorry can recall his name off the top of my head) and released to the government for presentation to the Emperor. The Emperor although a biologist was not without scientific reference and his decision to end the war was made forthwith.

The records, diaries, etc., that were seized belonging to the Marquis Kido, who was the closest to the Emperor as the Keeper of the Privy Seal, indicate how shocked the Emperor was when he found out it was indeed an atomic bomb and (apparently) exactly how much he had been deceived by the military. He then ordered the surrender in the meeting on August the 10th. Hasegawa dismisses all of this and or does not delve further into it, yet that is and more accurately fits the actual timetable.

I have found during my studies in the military and elsewhere that Richard B. Frank’s Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (1999) seems to be a very good and accurate volume on actions at the end of the war.

I did find that Hasegawa does promote the victimization of Japan from the bombings in his references to the US "rethinking" on the incidents and other areas, but again have not read it in its entirety.

Having said that, I would add that many Japanese historians tend to down play Hasegawa's approach, because he left Japan and has naturalized in the US (I think he is still in the UofC system). So obviously, he will be underfire from here in Japan even though he was one of their fellow so-called, leftist members in his orientation while he was here.

I realize this is not a very detailed and supported answer to your post, but it is now happy hour and I must be off to make my contributions to a hoard of thirsty hostesses.
Cheers

[hundefar]

Hostesses win over discussions about nuclear holocausts every time.

IMO Hasegawa is somewhere in between people such as Gar Alperovitz and Richard B. Frank. The problem with Frank is that he does not use the new material that has surfaced, also he doesn't speak Japanese or Russian. Hasegawa's point is that the choice wasn't between atomic bombs or a land invasion, but rather it was a choice made because the americans wanted to keep the Russians out. Though I enjoyed "Downfall" and respect Frank, he does not possess the necessary abilities to analyse the material that Hasegawa does, and his method has some shortcomings too. I find that Hasegawa is more of the middleground between the two camps of historian.

I have to admit that it has been a while since I read the book ( I wrote an assignment comparing Hasegawa, Alperovitz and Frank) and one of my friends has it at the moment, so there are some details I can't check. I need to beat her up and get my book back. Luckily she is very small and fragile, so it should be easy.

Kampai!