Why Truman dropped the bomb

[Greji]

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/894mnyyl.asp

The Weekly Standard puts out a new look at the restricted intel and intercepts and who had access to them at the close of WWII. Some interesting reading for those who would proclaim Japan as totally defeated, destroyed and ready to unconditionally quit.

[homesweethome]

This is a great article:

This goes against what even I learned in school. It's funny how even the pendulum of history swings just like the interpretation of it.

[Charles]

Very interesting.

One related item of interest, a while back I saw an article that claimed Japan had broken US diplomatic codes, and as the war was reaching the end, they were reading all the diplomatic backchannel discussions of US surrender demands. This supposedly was discovered by an archivist who found copies of decoded US diplomatic messages in Japanese archives that hadn't been opened since the end of the war. I've been trying to relocate the source where I read this with no success.

[jingai]

The essay in a nutshell:

There are a good many more points that now extend our understanding beyond the debates of 1995. But it is clear that all three of the critics' central premises are wrong. The Japanese did not see their situation as catastrophically hopeless. They were not seeking to surrender, but pursuing a negotiated end to the war that preserved the old order in Japan, not just a figurehead emperor. Finally, thanks to radio intelligence, American leaders, far from knowing that peace was at hand, understood--as one analytical piece in the "Magic" Far East Summary stated in July 1945, after a review of both the military and diplomatic intercepts--that "until the Japanese leaders realize that an invasion can not be repelled, there is little likelihood that they will accept any peace terms satisfactory to the Allies." This cannot be improved upon as a succinct and accurate summary of the military and diplomatic realities of the summer of 1945.

I would be interested to see what other historians of this period think about the author's interpretation but wasn't able to find any reviews with a quick google search.

[Kuang_Grade]

Here in the US, PBS recently ran a 2 hour documentary on the end of the war that quotes Richard Frank quite often. You can find a transcript of the program here.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pacific/filmmore/pt.html
It's a bit long but there is some interesting stuff here....I posted a few snips below.

Narrator: The Potsdam Declaration, issued July 26, 1945, was an ultimatum calling on Japan to surrender unconditionally and without delay or "risk prompt and utter destruction." It also offered various terms for Japan to rejoin the family of nations, It was signed by the allies in the war against Japan but not by the Soviet Union, which had not yet declared war. When the ultimatum arrived in Tokyo, Japan's prime minister Admiral Kantaro Suzuki, said the government intended to ignore it.

Haruo Iguchi, Historian: Since the Soviet Union's name did not appear as one of the countries that had signed the Potsdam Declaration why don't we wait for their final word with regard to whether or not they can mediate?

Richard Frank: When the Potsdam Declaration was issued, within the inner sanctum of the Japanese government, even what we regard as the moderates deemed the Potsdam Declaration as a sign of weakening American will; that we had already offered all these terms before the first drop of blood was shed in the invasion. And they were fortified in the belief that they should just press on.

Narrator: The Potsdam Declaration had said, "We shall brook no delay." By August 5, after nine days, Japan had not officially responded. Hirohito did not press his government to accept it. Instead, he worried about how to preserve the Imperial Regalia, emblems of the legitimacy of his rule. The sacred mirror, symbol of the sun goddess, was worshipped at the Grand Shrine at Ise. The sacred sword, symbol of bravery, was preserved at the Atsuta Shrine in Nagoya City. The sacred curved jewel, symbol of affection, was enshrined at the Imperial Palace. The Emperor wanted all of them at the palace for protection.
<snip>
Edward Drea: Ultra told a startling story in July of 1945. Japanese units were moving into southern Kyushu at an alarming rate. It was as if the in very invasion beaches were magnets drawing the Japanese forces to those places where the Americans would have to land and fight their way ashore. It was very clear in the messages that the Japanese intended to fight to the bitter end.

Narrator: These intercepts were so secret that no one who saw them, including the President, was supposed to write about them. There is some evidence Truman saw the intercept dated July 25th.

Richard Frank: With Truman, we have this extraordinary entry in his diary on the 25th of July, 1945, where he talks about meeting in the morning with General Marshall and British Admiral Mountbatten, and they talked about the tactical and political situation. Well, there's no place in the world that US forces are engaged in a tactical battle on the 25th of July. It seems pretty clear to me that he must be talking about the intercepts. And what Truman is doing with that entry is leaving a cryptic message to us, down through the years: I saw, I saw, I saw.

Narrator: That happened to be the night Secretary of War Henry Stimson sent a wire authorizing the use of the atomic bomb.
<snip>
Narrator: General Marshall, the advocate of invasion, was having second thoughts. In July the intercepts identified nine divisions protecting Kyushu. On August 6th, they identified 13. For Marshall, it was a preview of hell. The landings at Normandy had been costly but successful. Marshall began to question if the invasion plans for Japan would succeed. He asked General Douglas MacArthur, who was to command the invasion, to consider moving the landing to northern Japan.

Edward Drea: Just imagine you're George Marshall, and on the eve of the Normandy invasion, you suddenly tell Dwight Eisenhower, "Hey, don't invade Normandy. Why don't we reschedule the whole thing and invade Norway, where the German defenses are weaker?" Well, I mean, the mind boggles because of all the work, all the effort, all the planning that's gone into this. Yet this is really, in effect, what Marshall is saying to MacArthur in August of 1945.

Narrator: The warning had been raised by his own intelligence officer, yet MacArthur downplayed it. Douglas MacArthur was determined to lead the greatest invasion in the history of warfare. One way to make an invasion possible, Marshall thought, would be to destroy beach defenses with atomic bombs. The Manhattan Project informed him at least seven would be ready by November 1st.

Edward Drea: Marshall is now planning to use atomic bombs as really as tactical support weapons against the Japanese beach defenses, to precede the landing by the American units almost as if it were naval gunfire support.

Richard Frank : The scientists had calculated that anybody who'd be killed by radiation would have already been killed by a rock or blast or heat. You read the contemporary planning documents, and you see that there is no appreciation of the potential danger of immediate or lingering radiation.

Edward Drea: If this would have happened, the invaders of the land of the gods would have entered the world of the dead on both sides
<snip>
Richard Frank: From the standpoint of securing their compliance, Soviet intervention was a far, far more potent argument. The prospect of massive Soviet armies sweeping down across Asia and confronting them, was a very real and intimidating prospect.

Conrad Crane: I think the best explanation of why the Japanese surrender is it's because a whole series of shocks that occur. Both bombs were important. And I think that the Russian invasion also is very important. Hard to weight which are more important. But I think it's worth saying that there's a certain equality there; that they are both very important.

Narrator: In explaining Japan's defeat, Hirohito wrote to his son, "Our military men placed too much weight on spirit and forgot about science." His wife, Empress Nagako, seemed to agree. A few days after the surrender, she wrote, "Every day from morning to night, B-29s, naval bombers, and fighters freely fly over the palace... making an enormous noise... As I sit at my desk writing and look up at the sky, countless numbers are passing over... Unfortunately," she added, "the B-29 is a splendid plane.

[Socratesabroad]

Any historian who gains possession of significant new evidence has a duty to revise his appreciation of the relevant events.

A good point - historical analysis/interpretation can (and, if new evidence surfaces, should) change.

I would be interested to see what other historians of this period think about the author's interpretation

Here's an example of existing opinion among some historians:
Hiroshima: Harry Truman on Trial

In the summer of 2001, on the occasion of the anniversary of Hiroshima, History News Network staged a mock trial of Harry Truman. The charge: that he violated the Nuremberg standards regarding the lawful conduct of war.

A bit of the defense's closing argument:

As to the vote of the jury of historians, I argue that once again, this is an academic exercise that can only work to make the historical profession look more foolish than many already consider it to be, should this meaningless jury actually vote to condemn Truman in retrospect for war crimes. Surely, such a vote will get some press attention--as to those endless Presidential surveys when historians tell the public Ronald Reagan was the worst President and stands at the end of the list---while liberal Democrats are always on the top. These polls and now this jury say more about the state of the historical profession and its politics than it does about the questions being discussed.

The defense cites Frank numerous times in its initial and closing arguments.

And, for the record, Truman was voted Not Guilty 7-2.