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IkemenTommy wrote:If China tried anything, then the U.S. will retaliate for sure and the Chinese know this and they are not that stupid. They would most likely first attack Taiwan instead as there are more national interests in that region.
IkemenTommy wrote:There is no need to mobilize the army when they could launch icbm's at Japan. A couple of those rockets could flatten out Nippon in a heartbeat.
Tsuru wrote:Homesweethome:
I take it Japan and China don't have aircraft carriers and/or subs capable of delivering nuclear warheads then?
Tsuru wrote:Homesweethome:
I take it Japan and China don't have aircraft carriers and/or subs capable of delivering nuclear warheads then?
IkemenTommy wrote:A doctrine allowing the US pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons in the event of a WMD threat to the country is under development and is awaiting confirmation by Donald Rumsfeld.
The option for the use of nuclear weapons would be open if an enemy was using or about to use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against its forces or civilian population, or as a way to destroy the WMD threat.
Another scenario for a possible nuclear preemptive strike is in case of an "imminent attack from adversary biological weapons that only effects from nuclear weapons can safely destroy."
Tsuru wrote:I much prefer this approach if I can to waiting for things to really get out of hand![]()
Japan's navy said yesterday it was keeping a close eye on Chinese military moves after five warships were spotted near disputed gas fields and the reported incursion of a spy plane.
Japan said Friday it saw Chinese warships, including a destroyer, for the first time near the gas field in the East China Sea amid high tensions between the two countries.
"We are aware of most of their [China's] activities and we will do our utmost to monitor the situation," said Admiral Takashi Saito, the chief of staff of Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force.
Chinese Ships Fire Upon Poor Japanese MSDF Ships, They have to shoot back in self defence.
One of the major flaws with Japan is its lack of land mass and population density ( far greater trouble than China )
as one report recently said N Korea will lose any war (along with S Korea and Japan) over 100 million people are living between Kobe/Osaka and Tokyo so all you need is one big missile
A number of advanced warships will gradually in the next two years come into service in the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The bulk of these ships will belong to two new guided missile destroyer classes called 052B and 052C. The 052C will be fitted with an advanced integrated air-defense system, supposedly similar to the US Aegis phased-array radar display, with a high capability to engage multiple targets simultaneously.
Evolution of the Chinese fleet
Chinese shipyards have already completed two 052C class ships, which are expected to be commissioned this year. It is probable that the PLAN intends to bring at least six ships of this class into service, deploying them in the three main operative battle groups that form the bulk of Beijing's fleet. This strengthening of forces will constitute a notable improvement in the performance of China's high-seas forces. The 052C class warship is equipped with an air-defense system based on a sensor apparently similar
to the Aegis device and equipped with an HQ9 surface-to-air missile (SAM), considered a long-range vertically launched missile with a 90-kilometer range (56 miles).
The HQ9 will be installed in eight vertical-launch-system, revolver-like stations (six forward, two aft), each with six missiles. Destroyers of this class will also have the capability to conduct long-range surface war missions using two kinds of surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs): the HN3 (a modern cruise missile with a range of 2500 kilometers or 1553 miles and capable of delivering a conventional or nuclear warhead) and the YJ12 (a supersonic missile with a range of 200 kilometers (124 miles). Also, if air defense will be the main duty of 052C class ships, the presence of a variable depth sonar array is expected to give them good anti-submarine warfare performance.
Deployment of this class is proceeding parallel with the construction and acquisition of a number of new surface and submarine vessels. This emerging situation suggests some foreign policy scenarios related to Beijing's moves in the next years.
In regard to China's surface fleet (currently consisting of 64 large combatant units: 21 destroyers and 43 frigates), for the next decade Beijing will be committed to the demanding process of replacing with more modern units obsolete ships, that had for so long reduced the Chinese Navy to a mere coastal fleet. For this reason, PLAN continues to bring into service units of Russian Sovremenny class destroyers, while pursuing the construction of 052B and 052C class warships, in addition to the construction of a completely new ship, being built in China's Dalian shipyard, that is expected to be very large and loaded with heavy surface armament (probably similar to Russia's Slava class cruisers).
At the moment, the creation of an extensive ship-borne air force by building and deploying aircraft carriers does not seem to have priority in China. Beijing appears more interested in studying foreign equipment (as in the case of the aircraft carrier Varyag, a former Soviet carrier initially acquired from Ukraine, which is badly deteriorated and only 70% completed in terms of becoming militarily operational) and then proceeding, in the future and without particular haste, to build its first domestically built aircraft carrier.
For its underwater fleet (currently consisting of 57 units: 51 diesel submarines (SS) and six nuclear powered attack submarines or SSN), PLAN is following the same pattern of its surface forces. With significant help from Russia, PLAN is modernizing the diesel sub fleet as highlighted by the decision to acquire eight other Kilo class boats, following the first four-unit batch purchased during the 1990s; as for Sovremennys, the possibility of having and deploying top units (in their category) will enable the Chinese fleet to achieve a considerable upgrade in both operative effectiveness and technological standards (in particular in the sensor and weapon fields).
PLAN, at the same time, is proceeding with the construction of diesel submarines based on domestic projects (Type 039 and 039A), which has been slowed down by a number of problems discovered in the planning phase. However, in the next few years, this process will give rise to the complete replacement of the large but ineffective diesel submarine force (packed with old Soviet-design vessels) with a modern and efficient diesel fleet. The building of the new SSN Type 93 class is proceeding in the same direction; these vessels, according to PLAN's intentions, should allow a significant improvement in Chinese submarine warfare capabilities, especially if the rumors suggesting that the Type 93 class can perform like the Soviet Victor III class or even like the early US Los Angeles class are confirmed.
It is important to note that construction of the new Type 094 nuclear powered ballistic missile class submarines (SSBN) is proceeding very slowly, even if China can now deploy one unit of this kind (Xia-class).
Regional crisis and the protection of sea lines of communication
The naval construction plan as a whole indicates that the duties that PLAN will be called upon to tackle in the next few years will be the protection of sea lines of communication to keep open the "choke points" relevant to China's trade flow, and power projection in areas identified as vital for China's national interests. All these tasks coincide with China's anxiety to acquire and protect the necessary natural resources (especially oil) to sustain the growing energy requirements of its national industrial system. Increased dependence on overseas resources will bring Beijing to require a greater effort by Chinese naval forces to protect the trade flows and show the flag in ports of countries that are considered important trading partners.
Moreover, PLAN will be required to conduct long-range missions in the open sea to defend exclusive economic zones and to control areas with uncertain sovereignty, as in the case of the Spratley Islands. These isolated islands, situated in the South China Sea, are claimed by China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines, due principally to the rich oil deposits believed to be located there. The ships commissioned by PLAN will enable China to conduct missions of this kind, with the aim of deploying a fleet overwhelmingly superior to those of all other Asiatic countries (especially Taiwan) with the exception of the Indian and Japanese navies, which Beijing can try, at least, to counterbalance.
The submarine fleet will have the same duties as surface vessels, but is also expected to be assigned the hard task of facing the "traditional" Taiwanese adversary and, supposedly, coping with US battle groups. In fact, it appears that Beijing discarded the possibility of deploying a limited number of aircraft carriers (which would appear excessive in relation to other regional navies) since they would have little hope of prevailing in an engagement with US naval forces. This explains why China's aircraft carrier planning and construction is slowing in pace. Indeed, Beijing now prefers a well-stocked fleet of diesel submarines and nuclear powered submarines to have the difficult role of exerting some deterrence against American ships in case of a crisis.
Following this path, China will rise to a respectable level of underwater power, partially repeating the Soviet strategy during the Cold War. However, unlike the past Soviet submarine fleet (essentially dedicated to attacking NATO forces and protecting bastions full of SSBNs), Chinese submarine forces seem to be assigned the role of supporting surface forces - in their attempts to control sea lines of communication, with the additional mission of trying to exert some form of counter-power against US forces.
In this context, moreover, the Taiwan issue requires careful examination. In fact, the expansion and improvement of the Chinese submarine fleet, especially in diesel submarine numbers, can give Beijing an additional card to play against Taipei under the form of a submarine blockade. Such a blockade is potentially very hard to neutralize and cope with, even for Taiwan's respectable anti-submarine warfare forces; this strategy can exert stronger pressure than diplomatic threats, but is not comparable to a real attempt at invasion, hazardous and hard to carry out - and also fraught with unforeseeable political and military consequences.
Conclusion
The Chinese fleet's evolution in the coming years suggests that PLAN will be essentially concerned with protecting sea trade with the aim of assuring an uninterrupted flow of energy resources to satisfy the needs most dependent on overseas resources and safeguarding sea lines of communication. The enlargement and modernization of the Chinese fleet will inevitably alarm surrounding countries and other regional powers (such as India and Australia) and will oblige other states to renew their surface and submarine forces. However, it appears unlikely that PLAN can, or will, become a force with global projection (notably far behind the US Navy's capabilities, or those of the Soviet Navy during the 1980s) in the next decade.
The chief missions that PLAN will be called on to perform are eminently regional, such as power projection to support claims to areas of dubious sovereignty, but with rich subsoil resources (such as the Spratley Islands), to achieve the same operative capability as the more powerful Asian fleets, and ability to engage such a demanding adversary as the Taiwanese fleet (able to perform at high levels due to continuous acquisition of American equipment). In relation to US Navy battle groups, PLAN can, at most, aim for the possibility of exerting some form of deterrence (especially through the use of submarine forces), thus refuting all those who, since the beginning of the 21st century, have imagined American and Chinese battle groups confronting one another to decide which state will rule over the Pacific Ocean.
Japan's Demand for Chinese Gas Data Reasonable: Energy Chief
Sep. 18--TOKYO -- Japan's demand that China hand over concrete data on its ongoing gas projects is not unreasonable because the area of resource development relates to a dispute over sovereignty, a senior Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry official said.
"When we discuss the boundary issue between the nations from the viewpoint of sovereignty, we need facts as a basis," Nobuyori Kodaira, the head of the METI's Natural Resources and Energy Agency, said in a recent interview with Kyodo News.
As tensions increased, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing proposed when first visiting Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi on June 22 that China and Japan cooperate in exploring the oil and natural gas reserves in the East China Sea. But instead of accepting that offer, Kawaguchi requested that China provide the exact locations, depths and other related data of its offshore drillings underway in the East China Sea, fearing lest that China may have violated Japan's interests in tapping marine resources. But Li did not give any further details, according to the Hong Kong press reports.
The Japanese government appeared to conclude that China is collecting oceanographic data for possible submarine warfare around that area, which Japan considers strategically essential for China to boost its military presence vis-a-vis Taiwan as well as the United States, according to conservative Japanese media, such as the Sankei Shimbun. The disputed gas field is in the vicinity of Taiwan and the disputed Senkaku Islands, which are claimed by both countries. The Japanese government seems to believe this was why China has refused to give any data and information on its oil and gas development in the region.
IkemenTommy wrote:Pentagon Revises Nuclear Strike Plan
A doctrine allowing the US pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons in the event of a WMD threat to the country is under development and is awaiting confirmation by Donald Rumsfeld.
The option for the use of nuclear weapons would be open if an enemy was using or about to use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against its forces or civilian population, or as a way to destroy the WMD threat.
The philosophy would be designed to work with tactical nuclear weapons whose primary use is underground WMD bunkers. Congress has yet to endorse the warheads because they say it would make it more likely that such weapons would be used or proliferated.
An unclassified draft of a US nuclear doctrine review that spells out conditions under which US commanders might seek approval to use nuclear weapons has been removed from a Pentagon website, a spokesman said Monday.
homesweethome wrote:
Invasion of Tibet.
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