Japan's bust started with a real-estate boom, lax lending and the propping up of financial firms -- and its recovery took a decade, says MSN Money columnist Jim Jubak. The Fed's rate cuts keep the US on the same path.
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Japan's bust started with a real-estate boom, lax lending and the propping up of financial firms -- and its recovery took a decade, says MSN Money columnist Jim Jubak. The Fed's rate cuts keep the US on the same path.
Mulboyne wrote:Richard Katz of the Oriental Economist has a piece in the WSJ today where he rejects the comparison. You need a subscription to read it but, in summary, he says that the magnitude of the two crises are different. Estimates currently suggest that the housing crisis will cost $250 billion which is 2% of US GDP. Katz says that even a doubling of that estimate still leaves it short of Japan's writedowns which were around 20% of GDP. He also says that US house prices rose 200% from 1996-2006 while Japan saw a rise of 500% from 1981-1991 and subsequent fall to 1981 levels. Again, if forecasts are right that that US house prices fall only 30%, then that would take them back to 2000 levels, nowhere near 1996 and a long way from 1986. Katz also believes that actions to deal with the subprime fallout have been much swifter and comprehensive than anything Japan's policymakers managed. He admits that things could get worse but points out that they would need to get substantially worse to come close to Japan's problems.
FG Lurker wrote:If someone (me, in this case) wanted to subscribe to one publication to get good insight into the world economy, what would you suggest?
Every time the US undergoes a bubble and bust, doomsayers make comparisons to Japan. Remember all those fancy charts back in the dot.com days showing how US stocks (the NASDAQ, I believe) mirrored the Nikkei during Japan's bubble and bust. And yet the 2001 US recession was the mildest in the postwar era. In my view, these comparisons are false on the following grounds:
1) Crises: financial and real
Most modern mature economies are surprisingly resilient even in the face of large financial shocks. Take 2000-2003, when the loss of wealth from America's stock market crash added up to a stunning 90% of US GDP. That dwarfs the 60% loss in the two years following the infamous crash of 1929. And yet, as noted above, the recession of 2001 was the mildest of the entire postwar era. For a financial shock to severely damage a modern economy for an extended period of time, that economy has to be vulnerable due to deep-seated structural flaws. Japan was the poster child for this malady.
2) The source of the crisis: structure vs. policy errors
Japan's economic flaws were woven into the very fabric of its political economy. While international firms like Sony and Toyota excelled, the vast majority of Japan's domestic economy was kept woefully inefficient by regulations and pervasive anti-competitive practices designed to protect the weak. The authorities responded to a structural shortfall of consumer income and demand by using monetary steroids to feed investment in unneeded plant and equipment. Both of these trends were reinforced by a dysfunctional banking system. The end result was a mountain of bad debt and "white elephant" factories, stores and offices.
By contrast, America's subprime fiasco resulted from correctable policy mistakes: mainly letting non-banks issue mortgages without having to heed the regulations applied to banks, such as requiring both a downpayment and proof of ability to pay back the loan. Former Federal Reserve chair Alan Greenspan refused to use the greater regulatory powers granted to him by Congress. Today, both the Congress and the new Federal Reserve chair Ben Bernanke are moving to correct these mistakes. Adding fuel to the fire, the tax code and stock option compensation system provided incentives to financial executives to take excessive risks with other people's money. Unfortunately, this problem is not being addressed.
3) The magnitude and scope of the crisis
As for the magnitude of crisis, there is no comparison. Most analysts believe the US housing crisis will cost about 3-4% of US GDP, although these estimates could rise as time goes on. The higher figure equals the size of the Savings & Loan crisis of the early 1990s. And yet, the 1990-91 recession was the second mildest downturn of the postwar era. By contrast, in Japan's banking crisis, total write-downs of NPLs amounted to a mammoth 20% of GDP.
Over the ten years prior to the 2006 peak, US housing prices in the 20 biggest cities rose by almost 200%. In the ten years prior to Japan's 1991 bust, commercial land prices in its six biggest cities rose by almost 500%. The subsequent bust not only erased all of that gain, but brought Japanese prices down to 25% below 1981 levels. Most forecasters think US housing prices will drop 30% from their peak, leaving them well above levels at the beginning of the boom.
While Japan's ills penetrated almost the entire economy, most of today's problem in the US is focused on subprime adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), which account for only 7% of all mortgages. 11% of all subprime ARMs are now in foreclosure, but among prime fixed rate mortgages, which account for 65% of all mortgages, the foreclosure rate is only 0.55% so far.
Despite all the talk of credit crunch, so far the US has not experienced anything more severe than the deceleration of credit that typically accompanies a recession. While interest rates have risen for risky assets and some narrow credit markets have seized up from time to time, ordinary bank loans for business and consumers are still expanding at a healthy clip. Total bank credit today is 8% higher than it was a year ago. By contrast, in Japan, total bank loans fell 25% from 1996 through 2007.
4) Policy response
US policymakers and financial institutions are responding far more quickly and aggressively than in Japan. Behind Japan's slow response was the fact that the pervasive structural defects made many of the needed solutions quite painful. For example, one reason that Tokyo took so long to resolve its nonperforming loan (NPL) crisis was because "zombie firms" provided "disguised unemployment" for millions of workers. By contrast, the US has much more room to maneuver. The government is applying fiscal stimulus equal to 1% of GDP, financial institutions are rapidly writing off bad assets while seeking new capital, Congress is working on mortgage relief plans, and, most importantly, the Federal Reserve is acting aggressively to forestall a credit crunch.
While there were certain mistakes in macroeconomic policy during Japan's "lost decade," the fact is that Japan's structural vulnerability made macroeconomic stimulus far less potent than in a healthier economy. By contrast, the US is capable of responding well to stimulus.
pheyton wrote:My friends are all in TI & RE, as I use to be in title insurance too so I speak with some understanding of the RE market.
Fair question. The short answer is yes. Of course, no sensible person would claim certainty in the current situation, but here is my best judgement.
I think the US situation resembles not so much Japan's long malaise but the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 (in nature but not in scale). In the Asian crisis, mistaken policies led to a financial crisis which then turned into investor panic. Horrible mistakes turned that panic into economic depressions. In the US case also, bad policies have led to financial crisis and investor panic. Fortunately, the US has not imposed on itself the same disastrous macroeconomic policies which it helped impose on Asia. So, we have a big disconnect in the US:. On the one hand, a big financial crisis. On the other, an economic downturn that, at least so far, is rather mild. But this should not strike us as impossible. We saw the same thing at the beginning of the decade. In the dot.com bust, we had a huge loss of financial wealth, but the mildest recession of the postwar era.
Today, GDP is still growing, though less so than before. The job loss of the last nine months have been only half as much as in the same period of the 1990-91 recession and a two-thirds less than 2001 recession. And most US economists expect that trend to continue, though Japanese economists tend to be more pessimistic.
Out of 55 economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal in early September before the latest episode, none forecast negative growth for 2008 and only one forecast negative gorwth for 2009. Only ten though 2009 would be worse than 2008. The average forecast was for 1.9% growth in 2009. Not great, but hardly a disaster. We'll have to see if these forecasts are revised downward--and by how much--when the next survey comes out in early October.
My great fear is that, if oil prices remain high, the recovery could be weaker and more prolonged than currently expected.
Another big difference between the US and Japan is that, in the US, the balance sheets of nonfinancial firms remain very strong. Their net worth is 1.3 times their liabilities. By contrast, when Japan's real estate bubble popped, it occurred at a time when nonfinancial corporations had big debts and had themselves invested in a lot of real estate (zaiteku). So, the US has a greater ability to absorb a financial shock than did Japan.
And US policymakers are being aggressive about trying to deal with the problem. When something doesn't suffice, they take additional, stronger steps. We can argue about the wisdom of their steps, but the denial factor is a lot weaker in Washington than it was in Tokyo.
So, saying the US crisis is in a totally different ballpark from Japan is not a plea for inaction. But it is a caution against undue panic. BTW, I made the same call against undue panic regarding Japan in 2003 when so many analysts were predicting a run on the banks and the JGB yields fell to the floor. So, I'm against undue panic whether we are talking about the US or Japan. As for due panic, well...
"Outlook for the U.S. Economy: Distilling the Credit Crisis and Lessons from Japan" will be the topic of an October 2 panel discussion at the New York Japan Society during 12:00-2:30 pm.. I will be one of the panelists.
The Japan Society will be podcasting the event later that day at
http://www.japansociety.org/corporate_event_podcasts. For those in the NYC area who wish to attend, contact Chris Poston at cposton@japansociety.org.
Mulboyne wrote:For anyone in New York, he also mentions a panel discussion on the matter. The rest of us will have to go for the podcast:
"Outlook for the U.S. Economy: Distilling the Credit Crisis and Lessons from Japan" will be the topic of an October 2 panel discussion at the New York Japan Society during 12:00-2:30 pm.
The Japan Society will be podcasting the event later that day at
http://www.japansociety.org/corporate_event_podcasts. For those in the NYC area who wish to attend, contact Chris Poston at [email="cposton@japansociety.org"]cposton@japansociety.org[/email].
Sept. 25 (Bloomberg) -- JPMorgan Chase & Co., the third- biggest U.S. bank by assets, agreed to acquire the deposits of Washington Mutual Inc. for $1.9 billion as the thrift was seized by regulators in the biggest bank failure in U.S. history.
The U.S. government closed Seattle-based Washington Mutual amid customer withdrawals of $16.7 billion since Sept. 15, the Office of Thrift Supervision said in a statement. WaMu had ``insufficient liquidity'' and was in an ``unsound'' condition, the OTS said.
SAN FRANCISCO (MarketWatch) -- China's government moved to calm financial markets Thursday and denied a report that it had ordered mainland banks to curb lending to U.S. banks, a day after rumors of financial stability led to a run on a Hong Kong institution.
The China Banking Regulatory Commission moved to quash a South China Morning Post report Thursday that said Chinese regulators have told domestic banks to stop interbank lending to U.S. financial institutions.
BERLIN: Financial meltdown on Wall Street could reorder the world economy and cost the United States its status as the world's financial superpower, Germany's finance minister said Thursday.
Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck told federal lawmakers that the collapse of storied U.S. banks and financial firms such as Lehman Brothers would leave "deep marks" on the world economy.
"The United States will lose its status as the superpower in the world financial system," Steinbrueck said. "The world financial system will become more multipolar."
Will the Fed's Rate Cut Help? The Japan Lesson
An interesting podcast from a couple weeks ago..Charles wrote:.. by Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman
http://media.slate.com/media/slate/Podcasts/bigmoney/TBM08120201_book_krugman.mp3Daniel Gross talks with Paul Krugman, author of The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008.
The government of Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced on Monday a new bailout for the British financial system that increases its control over lenders, saying it would offer banks insurance on troubled assets and take other measures to restore credit and support the foundering economy.
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